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THE OREGON TRAIL: A NEW PATH TO ENVIRONMENTALLY 
RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? 
JASON C. JONES* 
INTRODUCTION 
In today’s world, it is difficult to avoid the popular movement of going 
“green.”  To some, it seems as if every other commercial on television involves 
a new green product and just about every other company is making an effort to 
go green.1  In the last few years, environmentally and socially responsible 
products have gained widespread popularity, fostered the growth of new 
companies, and become significant profit centers for large corporations.2  
While debates may rage about the wisdom and efficacy of specific 
environmental or social policies, most agree that being environmentally and 
socially responsible is normatively better.3 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law.  I thank Sarah D. Murphy for her 
invaluable contributions and hard work on this Article. 
 1. See Stuart Elliott, Eco-Ads: The Aim Is to Say How They Save the World, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 17, 2006, at A11. 
 2. See Kelly Faircloth, Report: Consumers Still Shopping Green, INC.: THE DAILY 
RESOURCE FOR ENTREPRENEURS, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.inc.com/news/articles/2009/02/ 
green.html; Nathanial Gronewold, Appeal of ‘Green Products’ Growing Despite Recession—
Survey, GREENWIRE, Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.enn.com/lifestyle/article/39140; Joel Makower, 
In Recession, Business Keeps Going Green, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Feb. 2, 2009, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/feb2009/db2009022_982216.htm; Peter 
L. Mosca, Green Design Elements as Profit Centers, REALTY TIMES, June 16, 2008, 
http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20080616_greendesign.htm; Chris Reidy, Survey: Consumers 
Continue to Buy Green Products, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 18, 2009, available at 
http://www.boston.com/business/ticker/2009/02/consumers_conti.html; Kevin Voigt, Business 
Sees Green in Going Green, CNN.com, Dec. 21, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/BUSINESS/ 
12/14/environment; Greg Zimmerman, The Rise and Significance of Eco-Labels and Green 
Product Certifications, FacilitiesNet.com, July 2005, http://www.facilitiesnet.com/green/article/ 
Certified-Green--3087. 
 3. That is, few would likely argue that one should intentionally destroy the environment, 
but debate may arise about whether a particular policy is warranted or wise.  See David Hahn-
Baker, “We Have Met The Enemy . . .”  A Book Review of Sustainable America: America’s 
Environment, Economy, and Society in the 21st Century, 7 BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 259, 264 (2000), 
for more information about the moral responsibility of “sustainability,” from where that morality 
is derived, and the notion that current unsustainable practices could be based on our moral 
failings.  See also Glenn Israel, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National Standards for 
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In order to meet consumer demand, many companies4 have found 
themselves not only creating green products, but also changing their corporate 
lifestyle so that they, too, become environmentally and socially responsible.5  
In fact, the desire to become green has resulted in the development of 
publications, rankings, and standards that disseminate information to interested 
consumers regarding the most green products and companies.6  Consumers 
may use this information to discern among the many green products and green 
companies to determine which gets their hard-earned dollar.  Moreover, many 
consumers take this green initiative to the proverbial next level and seek 
environmentally and socially responsible companies to invest savings, 
retirement, and investment dollars.7 
It is easy to see why many companies feel the need to become, at least in 
the eyes of the consumer, environmentally and socially responsible.  There are 
several ways to accomplish this goal.  Most easily, businesses may create 
products or otherwise conduct business in such a way that is considered 
environmentally and socially responsible.  But what if this is not enough?  
Many believe that a shift in norms must occur in order to really address the 
situation and give corporations the freedom to consider the environmental and 
social effects of their decisions.8  The current perception is that a corporation’s 
internal law protects shareholders and thus imposes a duty on the managers to 
maximize the wealth of the shareholders.9  Therefore, the decision rule 
becomes one that is focused on generating profit or shareholder wealth and any 
focus on nonshareholder constituencies such as employees, the community, or 
 
Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 303, 303–04 (stating that green 
marketing is a response to the consumer seeking green products); Paul H. Luehr, Guiding the 
Green Revolution: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in Regulating Environmental 
Advertising, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 311, 312–13 (1992) (suggesting that consumers are 
seeking environmentally safer products). 
 4. The term “companies” is used loosely and colloquially to accommodate both public and 
private corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies. 
 5. Marc Gunther, Global Warming Could Melt Your Portfolio, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 21, 
2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/21/news/international/pluggedin_fortune/index.htm. 
 6. See, e.g., Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, http://www.sustainability-index.com/ (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2010); FTSE4Good Index Series, http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_ 
Index_Series/index.jsp (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).  The presence of sustainability rankings has 
stimulated a desire for inclusion among companies.  Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and 
the New Environmentalism, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 313 (2007). 
 7. See Trillium Asset Management, About Us, http://trilliuminvest.com/about/ (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2010); Green Century Funds, History, http://www.greencentury.com/about/history/ (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2010); Rebecca Clarren, Green Investing 101, SALON, Nov. 26, 2007, 
http://www.salon.com/mwt/good_life/2007/11/26/green_investing. 
 8. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Saving the World with Corporate Law?, 57 EMORY L.J. 947, 
960 (2008). 
 9. Id. 
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the environment is ancillary at best.  Professor Kent Greenfield recently 
pondered whether the shifting of norms or the changing of the decision rule or 
internal corporate law will lead corporations to internalize nonshareholder 
interests.10  I would argue that the latter will accomplish the former, and a new 
Oregon law (“Oregon Law”) would certainly be successful in this regard.11  
The provision in the new Oregon Law, if enacted by corporations, is not 
permissive12—unlike the various nonshareholder constituency statutes that 
came before it.13  Should a corporation elect, vis-à-vis their articles of 
incorporation, to make environmentally and socially responsible behavior the 
controlling norm, they would be forced to consider these nonshareholder 
interests.14 
The question then becomes whether this is a necessary constraint on 
corporate decision makers.  As elaborated in a recent article by Professor Judd 
Sneirson,15 whether a corporation has a duty to maximize profits, especially in 
light of the business judgment rule, is questionable.16  Moreover, Professor 
Sneirson suggests that, even if a corporation does have a duty to maximize 
profits, there very well may be a direct correlation between profits and conduct 
that is environmentally and socially responsible.17  Despite this, Professor 
Sneirson, similar to the Oregon legislature, believes that a corporation should 
do more than just act in an environmentally and socially responsible way—
incorporators should make environmentally and socially responsible behavior 
the internal law or decision rule of the corporation.18  This paper argues that 
such an election is unnecessary and could yield negative consequences. 
First, corporations (including Oregon corporations) do not necessarily have 
an enforceable duty to maximize shareholder wealth.19  This means that in 
reality, changing the decision rule addresses a red herring.  Even if such a 
wealth-maximizing duty does exist, corporations that make environmentally 
and socially responsible decisions despite their effect on profits are given 
significant leeway to do so from the business judgment rule.20  Another major 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Act of June 1, 2007, 2007 Or. Laws 254 (creating new provisions for corporations). 
 12. Id. 
 13. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 9.02 at 14 (2002). 
 14. Act of June 1, 2007, 2007 Or. Laws 254. 
 15. Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for 
Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987 (2009). 
 16. Id. at 1005.  See infra Part II, for a more detailed discussion of profit maximization and 
the business judgment rule. 
 17. Id. at 1010.  See infra Part III.B, for a more detailed discussion of profit sustainability 
and socially responsible behavior. 
 18. Sneirson, supra note 15, at 1017. 
 19. Id. at 995–96. 
 20. See infra Part II (discussing the business judgment rule). 
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issue may come from the arduous task in reaching a singular, legal definition 
of environmentally and socially responsible behavior. Decision makers who 
follow this new decision rule may find themselves in some surprising 
litigation. 
Part I of this Article discusses whether the shareholder primacy norm 
controls corporate decision-making, or whether the norm is enforced.  
Assuming that the shareholder primacy norm is the guiding decision rule, Part 
II discusses how the business judgment rule insulates decision makers from 
liability when they ignore the norm.  Part III then looks at the Oregon Law, and 
the law’s viability as a solution to changing the (norm) decision rule of 
shareholder primacy to include environmentally and socially responsible 
conduct.  Finally, Part IV concludes that changing the decision rule could lead 
to potential pitfalls such as shareholder lawsuits. 
I.  SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY NORM 
As explained in this section, the rationale for passing the Law was to free 
decision makers to make environmentally and socially responsible decisions by 
changing the decision rule (i.e. the shareholder primacy norm).21  As it turns 
out, the shareholder primacy norm, while a “foundation stone in the corporate 
governance system . . . is both unenforced and unenforceable.”22  Therefore, a 
change in the decision rule is, perhaps, unnecessary. 
A. Norm Development 
Economic scholars have often suggested that the business of business is to 
make profit.23  The shareholder primacy norm derives from a board of 
directors’ duty of care to the shareholders.24  This standard of corporate 
governance can be traced back to the somewhat contested decision of Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co.25  The Dodge brothers, with a group of minority shareholders, 
sued Henry Ford, the president and owner of 58% of capital stock in Ford 
Motor Company.26  The Company was prospering—it had profits, assets, and a 
surplus of almost $112 million, and about $54 million cash on hand.27  Henry 
Ford’s testimony indicated that shareholders should be satisfied with the large 
 
 21. See infra Part III.A. 
 22. D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 
985, 1002 (2008). 
 23. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 33. 
 24. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998). 
 25. 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919). 
 26. Id. at 669, 671. 
 27. Id. at 683. 
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dividends and gains previously dispensed to them by Ford Motor Company.28  
Ford stated that “Ford Motor Company has made too much money, has had too 
large [of] profits, and that, although large profits might be still earned, a 
sharing of them with the public, by reducing the price of the output of 
company, ought to be undertaken.”29  Consistent with this outlook, Ford Motor 
Company failed to declare any special dividend during the business year.30  
The Michigan court held that corporate directors have discretion to decide 
whether to pay dividends, but that power is abused when there is a large 
accumulation of surplus cash that is not needed for corporate business.31  The 
court reasoned that the corporation’s purpose was to make profits for the 
shareholder: “It is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape 
and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of 
shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others.”32  Thus, the 
court focused on Ford’s purpose and stated: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of 
the stockholders.  The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.  
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain 
that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of 
profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to 
devote them to other purposes.33 
Dodge spawned the famous debate between Professors Adolf Berle and 
Merrick Dodd.34  In that debate, Professor Berle argues that: 
[A]ll powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, 
or to any group within the corporation, whether derived from statute or charter 
or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit 
of all the shareholders as their interest appears.35 
Therefore, this shareholder primacy norm has developed from a duty to make 
decisions in the best interests of the shareholders.36  The interpretation of this 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 683–84. 
 30. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683. 
 31. Id. at 682. 
 32. Id. at 684. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Adolf Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931) 
[hereinafter Berle, Powers in Trust]; Adolf Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees, 
45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Merrick Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties 
of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935). 
 35. Berle, Powers in Trust, supra note 34, at 1049. 
 36. Smith, supra note 24, at 278. 
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duty, in following with Dodge,37 is that shareholder primacy means 
shareholder wealth maximization.38 
B. Norm in Practice 
According to some, “the shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . has 
been fully internalized by American managers.”39  Yet many sources offer 
support for the notion that there is no corporate requirement to maximize 
shareholder profits.  Even Professor Stephen Bainbridge acknowledged that 
“there are surprisingly few authoritative precedents on point.”40  As a general 
illustration, the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of Corporate 
Governance provides a source of doctrinal authority.41  It states that the 
corporation “should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with 
a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”42  ALI’s use of 
“enhance” serves as a critical contrast to “maximize,” as used by the court in 
Dodge.  Moreover, the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance provides 
that the corporation “may devote a reasonable amount of resources to public 
welfare, humanitarian, educational and philanthropic purposes” even if 
 
 37. Of course, others hold a countervailing viewpoint that Dodge only provides dicta 
regarding a wealth maximization norm.  See generally Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop 
Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 167 (2008); Nathan Oman, Corporations 
and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 
101, 135–36 (2005); Sneirson, supra note 12, at 1002. 
 38. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133–34 (1962) (“Few trends could 
so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate 
officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as 
possible.”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1993) (arguing that 
shareholder wealth maximization is the norm which guides corporate decision makers); Henry 
Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 
(2001); Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 177, 177 (2008); JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, ALAN R. PALMITER, & FRANK PARTNOY, 
CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIAL AND PROBLEMS 87 (6th ed. 2007); ROBERT 
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986) (“Although corporation statutes do not answer 
this question explicitly, lawyers, judges, and economists usually assume that the more ultimate 
purpose of a business corporation is to make profits for its shareholders.”); Robert Roman, Less is 
More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 
18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 186 n.30 (2001); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder 
Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 975 (1992). 
 39. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. 
CORP. L. 657, 717 (1996). 
 40. STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 410 (2002). 
 41. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE OBJECTIVE AND CONDUCT OF 
THE CORPORATION § 2.01 (1992). 
 42. Id. 
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corporate profit is not enhanced.43  ALI’s provision illustrates that a 
corporation does not have a sole duty to maximize profits and can engage in 
socially responsible conduct.  As a result, we see that “even though the 
shareholder primacy norm is closely associated with debates about the social 
responsibility of . . . corporations, its impact on the ordinary business decisions 
of such corporations is limited.”44 
Furthermore, in Delaware, as concluded in Revlon v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc.,45 a corporation’s duty to maximize shareholder wealth 
is limited in scope to situations involving buyout negotiations.46  The court in 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,47 also stated that “absent a 
limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors, 
while always required to act in an informed manner, is not under any per se 
duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a 
takeover.”48  Decided within a year of Revlon, the court in Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum,49 required consideration of the effect of a takeover before 
deciding on a bid.50  Such an analysis, as espoused by Unocal, includes 
balancing the concerns, which may include “the impact on ‘constituencies’ 
other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps 
even the community generally).”51  Therefore, while “proponents of corporate 
social responsibility have seized upon the shareholder primacy norm in the 
belief that it is an important determinant of corporate decision making . . . [t]he 
evidence, however, does not support that belief.”52  In fact, “as a practical 
matter, courts will not interfere with corporate social responsibility because 
there is almost always a plausible argument that actions considerate of a 
corporation’s employees, customers, or creditors, or the environment, are in 
the long-term interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”53 
 
 43. Id. § 2.01(b)(3).  This provision of ALI’s Principles of Governance recognizes that a 
corporation is a social as well as an economic institution, and there must be balance between a 
corporation’s economic objective and their social needs.  See id. at § 2.01 cmt. e. 
 44. Smith, supra note 24, at 280. 
 45. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 46. Id. at 184–85. 
 47. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 48. Id. at 1150. 
 49. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 50. Id. at 955. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Smith, supra note 24, at 323. 
 53. Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible” Shareholder, 
10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 35 (2005). 
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C. Oregon’s Law on a Corporation’s Duty to Maximize Profits 
Oregon’s case law also lacks any type of direct standard requiring a 
corporation to operate for the primary purpose of maximizing profits for the 
shareholders.54  Likewise, Oregon’s state code follows the ALI’s language and 
provides that a corporation may “[m]ake payment or donations or do any other 
act, not inconsistent with law, that furthers the business and affairs of the 
corporation.”55  It is not surprising that the Oregon courts apply the ALI’s view 
because Organ lacks a law directly incorporating the shareholder primacy 
norm and Oregon courts have found the ALI’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance particularly important in considering other questions of corporate 
law.56  The ALI states that a corporation’s objective should be to enhance 
profit and shareholder gain, but with a restrained view that a corporation does 
have the power to “devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, 
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.”57  Thus, if a 
corporation implements environmentally and socially responsible policies, its 
actions would be quite reasonable given Oregon authority. 
Instead of placing an emphasis on a legal standard for a corporation to 
maximize profits, Oregon case law focuses on shareholder interests and the 
obligation the corporation and its directors owe to shareholders.  For example, 
in Locati v. Johnson, the court lays out the general rule that a corporation’s 
directors owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders.58  The court defined a 
fiduciary duty as one that seeks “the interest of the beneficiary rather than the 
personal interest of the fiduciary . . . which might suggest that failing to seek 
the interest of the minority is sufficient to show a breach of duty.”59  Therefore, 
although Oregon law clearly indicates shareholder primacy through its law on 
fiduciary duties, it goes no further than Professor Berle’s direction that the 
 
 54. See Hearing on H.B. 2826 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Leg. Assem. 1 
(Or. 2007) (testimony of James M. Kennedy, Private Attorney) [hereinafter Kennedy] (providing 
only persuasive authority regarding a legal standard to maximize profits). 
 55. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.077(2)(p) (West 2008).  See infra Part IV at note 126 for 
further discussion. 
 56. See supra Part II.B.  Cf. Klincki v. Lundren, 695 P.2d 906, 919 (Or. 1985) (adopting a 
tentative draft of ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance in a corporate opportunity case); 
Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 912 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (using Principles in determining 
directors fiduciary duties); Noakes v. Schoenborn, 841 P.2d 682, 685–86 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) 
(using Principles in considering the question of whether a party can bring a derivative action). 
 57. A.L.I., supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 58. Locati v. Johnson, 980 P.2d 173, 175 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). 
 59. Id. at 175–76 (citing Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 912 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)).  This 
rule suggests that minority stockholders’ interests in socially and environmentally responsible 
decisions could outweigh interests in shareholder wealth maximization. Thus, a corporation could 
face lawsuits for a breach of a fiduciary duty if it does not seek socially and environmentally 
sound decisions despite its attempts to maximize profits for the corporation and shareholders. 
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corporation’s decision makers owe a duty to the shareholders, generally.60  
And, even if such a duty were interpreted as it generally is, the “universal 
application of the business judgment rule [including its application in Oregon] 
makes the shareholder primacy norm virtually unenforceable.”61 
II.  THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
The Oregon Law’s purpose is to give corporations the ability to change 
their internal governance by changing the decision rule.62  The decision rule 
(shareholder primacy norm), is derived from the duty of care—a standard of 
conduct that the decision makers should adhere to when making corporate 
decisions.63  This duty of care dictates that the decision makers should act in 
the best interests of the shareholders.  Thus, the question becomes, what effect 
does this shareholder primacy norm have on corporate decision makers when 
making decisions?  The answer: “[I]t does not matter.”64  Decision makers, 
when making operational decisions, “are insulated from liability by the 
business judgment rule.”65  The business judgment rule is the standard of 
review by which decision makers will be judged, and absent some conflict of 
interest or fraud, “their decisions will not be second-guessed in the courts.”66  
With respect to whether decision makers should strictly adhere to shareholder 
primacy, the generally accepted principle is that “decision makers may, but do 
not have to, consider non-shareholder constituencies when making their 
business decisions.”67  The obvious corollary to this rule is that decision 
makers are free to deviate from the shareholder primacy norm and consider 
nonshareholder constituencies when making their business decisions.  They are 
free to do so because of the protection provided by the business judgment rule. 
The business judgment rule creates a presumption that decision makers are 
acting in the corporation’s best interest.  This presumption can only be rebutted 
by showing some abuse of discretion.68  For example in the hallmark case of 
 
 60. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 61. A.L.I., supra note 41, at 286. 
 62. See Kennedy, supra note 54. 
 63. See generally, BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, § 9.2 (discussing shareholder wealth 
maximization). 
 64. Id. at 414. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Judd F. Sneirson, Doing Well by Doing Good: Leveraging Due Care for Better, More 
Socially Responsible Corporate Decisionmaking, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 438, 465 
(2007). 
 67. Id. at 462. 
 68. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (overruled on other grounds) 
(describing the business judgment rule as giving deference, absent an abuse of discretion, to the 
business decisions because such decisions constitute “a presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
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Shlenksy v. Wrigley, Philip K. Wrigley, the majority shareholder of the 
Chicago Cubs, also operated Wrigley Field, the Cubs’ home field.69  Wrigley 
refused to install field lights for night baseball games despite the fact that every 
major league team scheduled most games at night.70  A minority stockholder 
brought a suit against the directors, claiming that they were losing money by 
not participating in night games and, therefore, that the directors acted for 
reasons unrelated to the financial interest and welfare of the Cubs.71  Wrigley 
may have had valid reasons in its decisions, but the court held it was not within 
the court’s province to determine the correctness of those decisions absent 
elements of fraud or illegality.72  Therefore, although shareholder wealth 
maximization may have led the courts to order Wrigley to participate in night 
games, the court refused to second-guess because of the high deference given 
to corporate decision makers by the business judgment rule.73 
In Smith v. Van Gorkom,74 however, the court showed almost no regard for 
a corporation’s business judgment.  In Smith, Van Gorkom, the CEO, and other 
directors of Trans Union solicited a merger offer, and, in doing so, acted on his 
own and capriciously arrived at a $55 per share price.75  The court found that 
the directors did not exercise good faith and informed judgment when they 
accepted the offer of $55 per share because they took no action to substantiate 
the offer nor tried to acquire more information about the acquisition.76  Thus, 
the court did not recognize any “good faith informed judgment” by the 
directors.  Building on Wrigley, courts have and will likely continue to give 
deference to the operational decisions of the corporation’s decision makers so 
long as they are reasonably informed and made in good faith. 
 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company”); In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 
F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Overcoming the presumptions of the business judgment rule on 
the merits is a  task.”); Halpert Enters., Inc. v. Harrison, No. 07–1144-cv, 2008 WL 4585466, at 
*2 (2d Cir. Oct. 15, 2008); Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 1989); MHC Inv. Co. 
v. Racom Corp., 323 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 69. 237 N.E.2d 776, 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 777–80.  Almost all major league baseball games were played at night.  Id.  The 
court offered a possible reason for Wrigley’s decision, stating: 
For example, it appears to us that the effect on the surrounding neighborhood might well 
be considered by a director who was considering the patrons who would or would not 
attend the games if the park were in a poor neighborhood.  Furthermore, the long run 
interest of the corporation in its property value at Wrigley Field might demand all efforts 
to keep the neighborhood from deteriorating.   
Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 781. 
 74. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (overruled on other grounds). 
 75. Id. at 866–68. 
 76. Id. at 876–78. 
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A clearer definition of the business judgment rule was outlined in Aronson 
v. Lewis.77  In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court defined the business 
judgment rule as: 
[A] presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.  Absent an abuse 
of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts.78 
Quite plainly, in Delaware, the business judgment rule gives great deference to 
corporate decision makers who, in their own determination, act in the 
corporation’s best interests.79  Even if those decisions take into account the 
corporation’s impact on communities, employees, customers, and other 
nonshareholder constituents.80  Delaware courts have made it their purpose not 
to interfere with directors’ decisions on questions of policy and business 
management,81 and as long as the directors appear to have acted in good faith, 
the courts will not interfere with directors’ discretion.82  Not surprisingly, the 
Oregon courts have applied a similar rule when faced with opportunities to 
second-guess decision makers. 
A. Oregon’s Business Judgment Rule 
Similar to the general business judgment rule, Oregon’s rule acts as a 
shield from unprofitable or unpopular decisions made in the course of business 
so long as the directors acted in good faith, with due care, and within their 
authority.83  The Oregon statute regarding director duty of care provides: 
 
 77. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 78. Id. at 812 (internal citations omitted); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 
(Del. 2000).  The court found that the “directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the 
directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act 
in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a 
grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably 
available.”  Id. 
 79. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 805. 
 80. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding that 
directors are able to consider various factors when making decisions including impact on non-
shareholder constituents, employees, suppliers, customers, and the community). 
 81. Mercantile Trading Co. v. Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 154 A. 457, 461 (Del. Ch. 1931). 
 82. See Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 1973); Kaplan v. 
Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch. 1977). 
 83. See Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1977).  This is similar to the way that other 
jurisdictions handle the business judgment rule.  See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.357(2)–(4) (West 
2003).  The standard for corporate directors in the Oregon statute provides: 
(2) In discharging the duties of a director, a director is entitled to rely on information, 
opinions, reports or statement including financial statements and other financial date, 
if prepared or presented by: 
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A director shall discharge the duties of a director, including the duties as a 
member of a committee, in good faith, with the care an ordinarily prudent 
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances and in a 
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation.84 
This duty of care follows Delaware and the ALI’s standard and supports the 
notion that, so long as the decision makers are carrying out their duties in good 
faith manner, they will be insulated from liability and the courts will abstain 
from reviewing their decisions. 
This is evidenced by Zidell v. Zidell, where the Oregon Supreme Court 
analyzed the duties of corporate directors and the proper role of courts in 
overseeing corporate policies.85  The court held that for the judiciary to 
interfere in a corporate decision, there must be evidence that the decision 
amounted to fraud, bad faith, or an abuse of discretion on the part of corporate 
officials authorized to make the decision.86  The court stated that it was “not 
the province of the court to act as general manager of a private corporation or 
to assume the regulation of its internal affairs.”87  In other words, Zidell sets a 
high burden of proof that must be shown to penetrate the deference allowed by 
Oregon courts.88 
 
(a) One or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director 
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented; 
(b) Legal counsel, public accountants or other persons as to matters the director 
reasonably believes are within the person’s professional or expert competence; 
or 
(c) A committee of the board of directors of which the director is not a member if 
the director reasonably believes the committee merits confidence. 
(3) A director is not acting in good faith if the director has knowledge concerning the 
matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection (2) of this 
section unwarranted. 
(4) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take any 
action, if the director performed the duties of the director’s office in compliance with 
this section. 
Id. 
 84. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.357(1) (West 2003). 
 85. Ziddell, 560 P.2d at 1089. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (citing Gay v. Gay’s Super Markets, 343 A.2d 577 (Me. 1975)). 
 88. See id. at 419 (“If there are plausible business reasons supportive of the decision of the 
board of directors, and such reasons can be given credence, a Court will not interfere with a 
corporate board’s right to make that decision.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Naito v. 
Naito, 35 P.3d 1068, 1083 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that the corporation’s management 
and directors are usually in the best position to determine the factors that go into deciding a 
corporation’s needs). 
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A more recent case, Crandon Capital Partners v. Shelk,89 defined the 
business judgment rule as a “presumption that in making a business decision 
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in 
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”90  The court further explained, “A hallmark of the business 
judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 
board if the latter’s decision can be attributed to any rational business 
purpose.”91  Crandon effectively established the business judgment rule in 
Oregon as the same rule Delaware courts use in interpreting and deferring to a 
corporation’s business judgment.92  Therefore, although supporters of the 
Oregon Law argued that Oregon lacked such a standard, Oregon seems to have 
a rather well-defined business judgment rule that protects decision makers who 
implement environmentally and socially responsible policies.93 
III.  OREGON’S LAW 
Corporate law is, effectively, the set of rules that controls the decision 
making structure of the corporation.94  Proponents of corporate social 
responsibility argue that corporate law in the United States is “used almost 
exclusively to protect shareholders (or the firm itself).”95  Therefore, other 
nonshareholder constituents or “stakeholders” such as employees, 
communities, etc., must rely upon “external” regulations such as 
environmental regulations, disclosure requirements, or consumer protection 
laws.96  Through the passing of a recent law, Oregon took the first step at 
changing a corporation’s internal law or decision rule to consider the interests 
of nonshareholder constituencies. 
Oregon corporations can now make “green” more than just a mission 
statement.  A new law amending Oregon’s corporation code97 provides that a 
corporation’s articles of incorporation may set forth “[a] provision authorizing 
or directing the corporation to conduct the business of the corporation in a 
manner that is environmentally and socially responsible.”98  The provision, if 
 
 89. 181 P.3d 773 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). 
 90. Id. at 782 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 91. Id. (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 92. See supra note 56. 
 93. See Sneirson, supra note 15, at 1019. 
 94. Smith, supra note 22, at 989. 
 95. Greenfield, supra note 8, at 951. 
 96. Id. 
 97. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(e) (West 2008).  The law was passed in June 2007 and took 
effect on January 1, 2008. 
 98. Id. 
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adopted, requires all corporate decisions to be environmentally and socially 
responsible.99  The Law was enacted to protect corporate decision makers, who 
desire to make environmentally and socially responsible decisions, because the 
assumption was that such decisions could make the corporation vulnerable as 
they are considered deviations from the supposed norm.100  To that end, and to 
the extent the purpose was to allow corporations to affirmatively declare their 
decision rule as one different from shareholder primacy, the Law is successful. 
The initial problem, however, is that the Law fails to define 
“environmentally and socially responsible.”101  This problem is exacerbated by 
a noted paucity of sources for a corporation to follow in determining what it 
means to be socially and environmentally responsible.102  Nonetheless, 
decision makers will be forced to interpret for themselves what it means to 
engage in environmentally and socially responsible conduct.  What happens 
when this interpretation is not shared by the shareholders of the corporation?  
Ultimately, the courts will decide, and the failure to carefully define and 
articulate what the corporation means by socially and environmentally 
responsible behavior creates an uncertainty that places the company at risk.103  
If a corporation assumes this risk and adopts the new provision, it is potentially 
opening the door to shareholder suits.104 
A. Purpose and Rationale of the Oregon Law 
The Oregon law’s apparent purpose, to allow for decision makers to 
account for nonshareholder interests, incorporates the ALI’s Principles of 
 
 99. Id.; see also infra Part IV. 
 100. See Andy Giegerich, Some Biz Lawyers Worry Over Sustainability Effort, PORTLAND 
BUS. J., Apr. 18, 2008, http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2008/04/21/focus7.html?ana 
=from_rss.  “The Purpose was to avoid any risk that might be left for the board of directors that 
chooses to operate in a way that recognizes environmental and sustainable goals . . . [i]t creates a 
safe harbor for them.  Yet anyone who doesn’t want to doesn’t have to under existing law.”  Id. 
 101. See generally OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047 (West 2008). 
 102. See JEFFREY HOLLENDER & STEPHEN FENICHELL, WHAT MATTERS MOST 29 (2004) 
(stating that there is not one single definition of corporate social responsibility); ADRIAN 
HENRIQUES, CORPORATE TRUTH 27 (2007); JOHN J. KIRTON & M.J. TREBILCOCK, HARD 
CHOICES, SOFT LAW 191 (2007); WILLIAM C. FREDERICK, CORPORATION, BE GOOD! 44 (2006); 
JOHN C. DERNBACH, ENVIRONEMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, STUMBLING TOWARD 
SUSTAINABILITY 550 (2002). 
 103. Practitioners have already expressed concern over the new law in Oregon.  See Perkins 
Coie, Recent Oregon Legislation Addresses Corporate Social Responsibility, PERKINSCOIE.COM, 
Jan. 1, 2008, http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/pubs_detail.aspx?publication=1553&op=updates 
(arguing that social responsibility provisions should be specific, not general, and that social 
responsibility legislation may encourage shareholder activists); see also infra Part IV. 
 104. Coie, supra note 103. 
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Corporate Governance standard involving a corporation’s objective and 
conduct.105  The relevant portion of the ALI principles provides that: 
 Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the 
corporation, in the conduct of the business: (1) Is obliged, to the same extent as 
a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law; (2) May take into 
account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to 
the responsible conduct of business; and (3) May devote a reasonable amount 
of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic 
purposes.106 
The incorporation of ALI’s essential principles into Oregon Law aims to 
protect corporate decisions considered to be environmentally and socially 
responsible.107  As noted above, the rationale for such a provision is attributed 
to the supposed deficiency of Oregon case law in defining the business 
judgment rule, which protects decision makers who deviate from the 
shareholder primacy norm, and thus, accommodates environmentally and 
socially responsible decision-making.108  During debate on the bill, proponents 
argued that an absence of a strong business judgment rule made socially and 
environmentally responsible corporate decisions vulnerable to an assumed duty 
owed by corporations to maximize shareholder value.109  In other words, 
proponents argued that courts might determine that socially and 
environmentally responsible decisions run afoul of a corporation’s duty to 
maximize profit, which chills a corporation from engaging in socially and 
environmentally responsible policies.110  Not only is this a false premise, as 
argued in this Article, but it turns out that profitability and environmental and 
social responsibility are not necessarily perpendicular. 
B. Profitability and Sustainability 
The main justification for the Oregon law is a fear that corporations 
making decisions to act in an environmentally and socially responsible way 
could be subject to lawsuits because those decisions do not necessarily equate 
to actual profits.111  By electing to be an environmentally and socially 
responsible corporation, the decision makers presumably feel more at liberty to 
make decisions that will further this objective as opposed to those decisions 
that will only produce the maximum profit.  As Professor Sneirson noted, the 
 
 105. Kennedy, supra note 54, at 1. 
 106. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
53 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 107. See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 1. 
 108. Id. at 2. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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notion that environmentally and socially responsible business is unprofitable 
may be more perception than reality.112 
The discussion of environmentally and socially responsible corporate 
behavior is more commonly covered under the umbrella of “sustainability.”113  
Sustainability, more commonly discussed among humanitarians and moralists, 
has recently, and quite abruptly, become a part of the vocabulary of many of 
the world’s most successful corporations.114  In fact, many corporations and 
their directors are “recognizing that economic and social returns are now 
coming together to satisfy shareholders and stakeholders alike.”115 
This notion is further substantiated under what has become known as the 
“double bottom line.”116  Double bottom line is the concept that “profits” have 
both a financial and social component.117  Moreover, the maximization of 
shareholder wealth can be accomplished not only by monetary revenue, but 
also by creating positive externalities and reducing negative externalities of the 
corporation’s production.118  This notion is very much consistent with the 
holding in Paramount, that directors can consider the impact on 
nonshareholder constituents including employees, suppliers, customers, 
creditors, and the community generally.119 
As noted by commentator Pete Engardio, there has been a significant 
investment in the sustainability agenda.120  Not only in the form of investment 
into companies meeting the criteria for being “sustainable,” but also into 
research to satisfy rising investor demand.121  In addition to creating 
“sustainable” products, corporations are finding investor demand and are now 
including reports on their “sustainable” efforts in their annual reports to 
shareholders.122  Therefore, corporations are certainly seeing a payoff for going 
 
 112. Sneirson, supra note 15, at 991. 
 113. The lack of material defining “environmentally and socially responsible” could be 
problematic.  See supra Part II. 
 114. Pete Engardio, Beyond the Green Corporation, BUS. WK., Jan. 29, 2007, at 50, 52. 
 115. Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the 
Business Judgment Rule Protects A Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 628 (2008).  Moreover, “They are ensuring that these groups no longer 
have to be at odds with each other.”  Id. 
 116. Id. at 633. 
 117. Id.  The double bottom line is achieved by “harnessing innovation, people, and resources 
to develop an enterprise that is self-sustaining, makes money, and solves a social problem.”  Id. 
 118. Id. at 635. 
 119. Paramount Commc’n. Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989). 
 120. Engardio, supra note 114, at 56–57. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Kerr, supra note 115, at 644 (citing William Rosenzweig, Double Bottom Line 
Project Report: Assessing Social Impact In Double Bottom Line Ventures (2004) (Center for 
Responsible Business Working Paper Series, Paper 13, 2004), available at http://repositories. 
cdlib.org/crb/wps/13. 
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green.  And, as Unilever CEO Patrick Cescau puts it, “[It’s] about . . . growth 
and innovation.  In the future, it will be the only way to do business.”123  Thus, 
the idea that shareholder primacy and environmental and social responsibility 
are at odds and corporations are not free to internalize nonshareholder interests 
is false.  Moreover, changing the internal law of the corporation to mandate 
environmental and social responsibility may be the corporate governance 
equivalent of cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face.  Decision makers will 
be constrained by this decision rule and deviations will be met with potential 
lawsuits from inside and outsides the corporation. 
IV.  LITIGATION 
Adopting the provision provided by the Oregon Law that the corporation 
will act in an environmentally and socially responsible manner will have the 
positive effect of changing the law of the corporation; decision makers will be 
bound to act within this framework.  The effect of this is two-fold: first, the 
potential revival of the ultra vires law suit; and second, possibly giving 
standing to nonshareholder to enjoin the corporation from acting in a way that 
is not considered environmentally and socially responsible. 
A. Ultra Vires 
Generally, the law of a corporation is derived from three separate sources: 
(1) The requirements set out in the corporation’s charters and bylaws; (2) the 
statutory law of the state in which the corporation is incorporated; and (3) case 
law.124  Traditionally, the doctrine of ultra vires “limited the authority of 
corporations to the purposes and activities named in the corporate charter.”125  
Purposes for this limitation range in theories of a contractual relationship 
between shareholder and corporation126 to an interest in limiting the effects of 
 
 123. Id. at 632. 
 124. Stout, supra note 37, at 168; see also 7A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, Ch. 40 Ultra Vires §§ 3399–3579 
(1997). 
 125. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1279, 1283 (2001) (citing JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 60 (1972) (“[T]he general powers of a 
corporate body must be restricted by the nature and object of its institution.”)).  Professor 
Greenfield goes on to state, “According to an early nineteenth-century treatise, a corporation is 
confined to the sphere of action limited by the terms and intention of the charter.”  Id. at 1380 
n.68 (internal quotations omitted). 
 126. Id. at 1304.  It can be argued that the ultra vires doctrine exists as to enforce a 
contractual agreement between shareholders and directors regarding the purpose of the 
corporation.  This ultimately protects the shareholders from those in charge of the corporation 
changing the business beyond the initial agreement.  See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION 
LAW § 1.1.3 (2000). 
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large corporations on society.127  Purposes of the limitation notwithstanding, 
ultra vires generally meant to limit the corporation to only those powers 
enumerated by the charter and bylaws and not to limit the corporation from 
“illegal acts.”128 
Once prominent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
ultra vires129 doctrine has long since been declared dead.130  Before the modern 
era of corporate law, corporations were usually only created by an act of the 
legislature for a specific purpose, such as constructing a railroad.131  This 
charter which gives a corporation the power to act for a specific purpose also 
limited its ability to engage in activities that did not further that purpose.132  If 
the corporation went beyond its enumerated purpose, shareholders had the 
right to enjoin the corporation’s ultra vires acts that were beyond its 
enumerated powers.133  Limiting corporations to specific purposes acted as a 
check that held corporations accountable, which ultimately limited their 
economic influence in society.134  Modern corporate law, however, has evolved 
in such a way that these shareholder checks on corporate acts are effectively no 
longer available.  Courts and legislatures started expanding the limitation of 
corporate existence, which dissolved much of the limitation on corporate 
 
 127. Harry Rajak, Judicial Control: Corporations and The Decline of Ultra Vires, 26 
CAMBRIAN L. REV. 9, 18 (1995); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–49 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 128. 7A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 124, § 3400; see also State Savings & Loan Ass’n v. 
Bryant, 81 P.2d 116, 129 (Or. 1938) (distinguishing the act of the corporation that was illegal as 
opposed to ultra vires); but see Greenfield, supra note 125, at 1314 (arguing the opposite view). 
 129. The term is commonly defined as follows: “Unauthorized; beyond the scope of power 
allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1559 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 130. Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporation of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming 
Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 900 (2007); see Stephen J. Leacock, The Rise 
and Fall of the Ultra Vires Doctrine in United States, United Kingdom, and Commonwealth 
Caribbean Corporate Common Law: A Triumph of Experience Over Logic, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & 
COM. L.J. 67, 94 (2007) (“[A]bolition of the ultra vires doctrine probably comes closest to being 
complete . . . .”). 
 131. See Ashbury Ry. Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche, (1875) 7 L.R.E. & I. App. 653; see also 
Michael A. Schaeftler, Ultra Vires—Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra Vires Acts 
of Business Corporations, 9 J. CORP. L. 81, 81–83 (1984); Greenfield, supra note 125, at 1280 
(describing how law schools teach that the doctrine is “dead or at least deathly ill”). 
 132. GEVURTZ, supra note 126, at 21–22. 
 133. Greenfield, supra note 125, at 1282.  The doctrine of ultra vires acted as a device for 
corporations to avoid contracts or it could result in a corporation losing contracts.  This aspect of 
the doctrine, however, is not relevant to the discussion of this article. 
 134. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–49 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Greenfield, 
supra note 125, 1302–03. 
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activities.135  One example occurred when legislatures started allowing 
corporations to provide a list of their business purposes, which ultimately led 
corporations to provide exaggerated lists for all types of purposes.136  Finally, 
the legislatures established that corporations could provide their purposes to be 
for all lawful business in order to avoid the fruitlessness of creating an 
extensive list of purposes.137 
In Delaware, section 101(b) of the Delaware Corporation Code states, “A 
corporation may be incorporated . . . to conduct or promote any lawful 
business or purposes . . . .”138  Specific to this article, Oregon adopted the 
language of the Model Business Corporation Act.139  In fact, almost all states 
permit or require incorporators to define the purposes of formation in a 
corporation and generally such purposes are for “any lawful purposes.”140  
Therefore, as corporate law has changed so has the doctrine of ultra vires, and 
presumably all that remains outside the scope of a corporation’s power or 
purpose is unlawful business actions or activities that are not directed toward 
any business goal.141 
Current Oregon corporation law provides that “Every corporation 
incorporated . . . has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business unless a 
more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.”142  Such a 
limited purpose could include the direction that corporations “conduct the 
business of the corporation in a manner that is environmentally and socially 
responsible . . . .”143  By placing this limitation in the articles of incorporation, 
the incorporators could be resurrecting the once-dead ultra vires lawsuit. 
B. Shareholder Litigation 
Changing the internal law of the corporation could potentially have some 
negative ramifications.  The law transitions from the very vague “for all lawful 
 
 135. GEVURTZ, supra note 126, at 22; Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The 
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 214 (1985); Joel Seligman, A Brief 
History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 251 (1976). 
 136. GEVURTZ, supra note 126, at 23. 
 137. Id. 
 138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (West 2001). 
 139. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.074(1) (West 2003); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01 (2002) 
(“Every corporation incorporated under this chapter has the purpose of engaging in any lawful 
business unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 140. See Stout, supra note 37, at 169; Greenfield, supra note 125, at 1317 (“Articles of 
incorporation of specific companies tend to track the language of the applicable statutes and thus 
bolster the notion that the corporations themselves consider their authority as being limited to 
lawful purposes . . . .”). 
 141. See GEVURTZ, supra note 126, at 23. 
 142. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.074 (West 2003) (emphasis added). 
 143. Id. § 60.047(2)(e). 
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purposes” or unenforceable shareholder primacy norm to the very specific 
requirement that the decision makers operate the business in an 
environmentally and socially responsible manner.  The rise of general 
incorporation laws has eroded the ultra vires doctrine.  The Oregon Law, 
however, effectively reverses the “all lawful purposes” provision found in 
corporate charters.  By electing the provision provided by the Oregon Law, a 
corporation is binding itself to conduct business in a specific way.  If a 
corporation fails to act in a socially and environmentally responsible way, a 
shareholder could bring a suit seeking to enjoin the corporation from its ultra 
vires acts—acts that are not socially or environmentally responsible.  The 
protection once provided by the business judgment rule is now gone.  Decision 
makers are, under the current perceived norm and the protection of the 
business judgment rule, free to make decisions they deem to be in the best 
interest of the shareholders.  By electing the provision provided by the Oregon 
Law, they are binding themselves to a specific decision rule: A decision rule 
that specifically constrains the decision makers from making any decision that 
is not considered environmentally and socially responsible. 
This is troublesome because there is no singular definition of 
environmentally and socially responsible.  The inherently subjective standard 
leaves a determination of what is “responsible,” “environmental,” or even 
“social” to each individual.  The corporation is leaving the determination to 
shareholders who may disagree with the corporation in their definition or in 
their application of environmentally and socially responsible behavior.  
Furthermore, when disagreement does arise between shareholders and decision 
makers with respect to what is environmentally and socially responsible, the 
corporation must avail itself to the interpretation of the courts.  Perhaps, this is 
a very dangerous position compared to whatever benefits that may be 
perceived from electing such a provision. 
C. Nonshareholder Litigation 
Generally, nonshareholder constituency statutes are permissive insomuch 
as they allow corporate decision makers to consider nonshareholder interests, 
but do not require them to do so.144  Given that the statutes do not require 
decision makers to consider nonshareholder interests, it is unlikely that 
nonshareholders would have standing to enforce them.145  Incorporating the 
requirement for environmental and social responsibility into the articles of 
incorporation changes the permissive nature of the statutes.  Adopting the 
environmentally and socially responsible provision would bind the corporate 
 
 144. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. 
REV. 971, 987 (1992). 
 145. Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing 
a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1233–34 (1991). 
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decision makers to act in such a manner, exclusively and without consideration 
to shareholder or other interests.  This potentially gives nonshareholders, 
environmental activist groups, human rights groups, etc., the opportunity to 
enjoin the corporation form acting in a way that they consider to be in violation 
of the law of the corporation.  The definition of “environmentally and socially 
responsible” becomes more unruly with the addition of nonshareholders to the 
game.  Under current law, Oregon corporations are free to consider 
nonshareholder interests in making decisions, but are not constrained in doing 
so.146  The mandatory nature of the language provided in the Oregon Law 
could potentially leave corporations conflicted as to who their master is and 
vulnerable to lawsuits from shareholders and nonshareholders alike. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Greenfield argues that “corporate law should not presume, 
without strong arguments, to prohibit corporate decision makers from taking 
into account the very societal interests that the corporation is ultimately meant 
to serve in the first place.”147  Corporations “will not, through their own 
generosity, internalize the external costs of their decisions or keep an eye on 
the social harms they produce.”148  The solution would then be to change the 
internal law of the corporation and shift the present decision rule to one that 
mandates the consideration of nonshareholder interests.  To this end, the 
Oregon Law is successful.  The language of the Oregon Law, however, 
presents other unique problems. 
Corporate decision makers are, pursuant to their duty of care, required to 
act in the best interests of the shareholders and the corporation, generally.  
Although many have interpreted this duty as a duty to maximize shareholder 
wealth, no such duty has been enforced by the courts.  In fact, the case most 
widely cited in this regard, Dodge v Ford, only speaks to this duty in dicta.149  
To the extent that decision makers are required to follow this decision rule, 
they are insulated by the business judgment rule.  Therefore, the Oregon Law 
does nothing more than fight back the great boogeyman of corporate law.  
And, in doing so, it makes the corporation more vulnerable than it was before. 
The corporation’s mandate, through its articles of incorporation, that it will 
act in an “environmentally and socially responsible manner,” creates 
unnecessary risk.  While it is true that it will change the internal law of the 
corporation and shift the norm to one that requires the corporation to consider 
nonshareholder constituencies, it is opening the door to a potential flood of 
litigation over what it means to be “environmentally and socially responsible.”  
 
 146. See supra Part III. 
 147. Greensfield, supra note 8, at 965. 
 148. Id. at 963. 
 149. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919). 
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The primary issue here is the Oregon legislature’s failure to define 
“environmentally and socially responsible.”  Through this omission, the 
legislature creates a scenario whereby the corporation, the shareholders, and 
the courts will each be allowed to interpret and define what it means to be 
environmentally and socially responsible.  Without adopting the provision that 
the corporation will act in an environmentally and socially responsible manner, 
the decision makers are free to consider such interests, so why adopt the 
provision and take the unnecessary risk? 
